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Abstract 
This article outlines the impact and changing nature of Chinese organised crime in the 
United Kingdom (UK). It reviews the conventional policing approaches to the problem 
in the UK and in China, and argues they are limited in their scope and could be 
substantially improved. It suggests this is possible by employing police specialists here 
and in-country. The evidence for the paper has been collected from interviews with the 
relevant law enforcement and government personnel in the UK and in China in 2010 
and again in 2014–15. 
Keywords 
The policing of organised crime, Chinese organised crime 
Research relating to the threat posed by Chinese organised crime to the UK is scarce, but 
available evidence (what little there is) suggests that this threat is changing. The lack of 
recent research hinders definitive judgement, but it seems that these changes have two 
key dimensions: the first is that the threat from locally based triads (secret societies) 
closely connected to Chinatowns with transnational links primarily to Hong Kong has 
diminished and been replaced by mainland Chinese networks which operate across the 
UK and have transnational links to mainland China (Dees, 2013; Silverstone, 2011; 
Wang, 2013). The second is that the types of criminality in which Chinese organised 
crime is involved have expanded. These now range from serious and organised crime 
such as production and exportation (to the UK) of firearms and new psychoactive 
substances through to mundane but financially profitable activities of copyright 
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infringement through the import and distribution of counterfeit goods. In between these 
two extremes lie several aspects of criminality which relate to China’s emergence as a 
top sending country for international students and its prominent position as the key 
manufacturer and exporter in the world: the importation of counterfeit cigarettes and 
loose tobacco, the smuggling of migrants and criminality connected to illegal 
immigration such as the setting up of bogus colleges, visa fraud, illegal working and the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime to China (ECMDDA, 2014; Europol, 2013; Shen et 
al., 2010; Treverton et al., 2009). This article will first explore how the threat from 
Chinese organised crime has changed and then show how these changes are confounding 
an effective policing response. 
Methodology 
The data for this article were collected during two discrete time periods. The first was in 
2010 and accompanied a study of the incidence of Chinese organised crime in the UK. 
The research involved speaking to (N ¼ 60) law enforcement practitioners, current and 
retired, who were tasked with combating Chinese organised crime in some capacity. The 
second batch of interviews (N ¼ 30) were conducted during 2014–15 with, in some 
instances, the same practitioners who remained in post and also with law enforcement 
personnel who have been appointed since then and are currently tasked with tackling 
Chinese organised crime. All the interviews were conducted under the guarantee of 
anonymity. The interviews were garnered from the key agencies/organisations: the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office; non-government organisations; local and specialist 
law enforcement organisations; Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; the UK Border 
Force.1 
The changing nature of the Chinese diaspora 
The Chinese diaspora have long been the most successful immigrant group educationally 
and entrepreneurially in the UK. Descendants of earlier migrants from Hong Kong form 
a pre-eminent example of ethnic success; these are among the best-educated and 
highestearning minorities in the UK, often being held up by politicians as an example of 
industry and ethnic integration (DES, 2006). This success has been attained despite three 
underlying trends within the broader community, which are not in themselves 
problematic except within this criminal context: geographical segregation, employment 
specialisation and income inequalities. 
Geographically the separation is apparent in London, as well as in Birmingham, 
Manchester and Liverpool, where there are Chinatowns with concentrations of Chinese 
supermarkets and restaurants. The relative success of the legal Chinese community 
masks some marked inequalities which stem from long-standing and ongoing 
involvement in the catering industries. For example, there are up to 12,000 Chinese 
takeaway outlets and 3,000 Chinese restaurants in Britain (John, 2001). This has 
ramifications in terms of wages and, in a survey conducted in London in 2005 on the 
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subject of migrant employment, 27% of migrants born in China were employed in the 
hotel and restaurant sector and, for those born in Hong Kong, the proportion was 26%. 
According to the same survey, pay rates for sectors of employment are lowest in the 
hotels and restaurants sector and therefore it is unsurprising that Chinese people are also 
over-represented in the lowest-earning groups (DMAG, 2005). 
All of these pre-existing issues of segregation, specialisation and income inequalities 
have provided cover for, and been exacerbated since the late 1980s by, a rising inflow of 
low-skilled economic migrants from mainland China, in particular but not exclusively 
from Fujian and Zhejiang (Kirby and Penna 2012; Liang et al., 2008; Pieke, 2004). 
Academic interest in this issue peaked subsequent to the tragic deaths of illegal migrants 
in Dover (2000) and Morecombe Bay (2004). The lack of academic work since might be 
taken as an indication that illegal migration has decreased, but this would be a mistake. 
It is estimated that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 illegal migrants of Chinese 
origin in the UK (Wu et al., 2010). There is an evolving three-way split between the 
wealthy children of mainlanders here primarily to study, the high-achieving descendants 
of Hong Kong Chinese and a disproportionately male illegal adult population, 
predominantly but not exclusively from the province of Fujian. The illegal community is 
amorphous so there are no definitive figures on its size, but a recent report estimates that 
the Chinese population in London could be ‘as large as 250,000 or it could be greater 
still, and as many as half this number could be undocumented’ (Pharoah et al., 2009: 23). 
The changing nature of Chinese criminal networks 
It is within the aforementioned Chinatowns, especially in the poorly paid catering 
industries, that Triad groups have historically been active throughout the UK. However, 
both interviews with law enforcement personnel and recent academic literature confirm 
the declining influence of the Triads both in the UK and elsewhere (Chu, 2005; Huisman, 
2008; Silverstone, 2011; Wang, 2013; Zhang and Chin, 2003, 2008), even if in the 
popular imagination their influence persists. As Zhang and Chin (2008: 191) write of 
human smuggling networks: 
Because these networks do not have a turf, or a name, or a leader, or sworn members, they 
are difficult for law enforcement authorities in host countries to understand or penetrate...as 
a result the local authorities simply lump all these networks together and call them the 
‘Chinese mafia’, the ‘Chinese triad’... 
Although there remain criminal vestiges and inflated rumours of Triad influence, their 
everyday activities have been significantly curtailed.2 This is due to the Triads’ 
hierarchical structures being too cumbersome to benefit from transnational criminal 
enterprises such as people smuggling or counterfeit cigarette selling, which depend on 
fluid networks. Instead it is new criminal networks of Chinese mainlanders who are the 
significant actors within many criminal markets. 
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This is not to say that preformed organised crime groups have arrived from China in 
a strategic way (due to hostile policing or criminal expansion from the mainland) but 
rather that the majority of illegal migrants3 become involved in criminal networks here, 
in response to their need for funds or work (Morselli et al., 2011; Silverstone, 2011). As 
recent research has made explicit, the pursuit and the subsequent acquisition of money 
are among the key drivers for these illegal migrants (Pharaoh et al., 2009; Silverstone, 
2011). The desire to make money needs to be set against the complex social context 
within Fujian and Zhejiang but, for the purposes of this article, motivation can be reduced 
to a simple economic calculation. In research conducted in 2010, within a sample of 25 
respondents from the illegal community, the mean fee paid to be smuggled was £15,800, 
although the fee varied from £8,500 to £24,000. In addition to this, almost all illegal 
migrants borrow money to fund the journey at commercial rates, which in this sample 
involved a mean interest rate of 15.6% and varied from 10% to 30%. Generally, faced 
with a rapidly rising debt, there is a commercial imperative to earn the money back as 
quickly as possible whilst taking as little risk as possible (Silverstone, 2011). 
Therefore it is unsurprising that migrants are involved with illegal businesses, where 
they can source products cheaply from the mainland and sell at great profit in the UK. 
For example, they were heavily involved in the wholesale production and street 
distribution of copied DVDs, the value of which is estimated to run into the hundreds of 
millions (Treverton et al., 2009). Second, they play a significant role in the production, 
importation and retail of counterfeit and untaxed cigarettes and tobacco. HM Revenue 
and Customs estimated that up to January 2012, 50 tonnes of untaxed tobacco were being 
sent to the UK from China each month by predominantly Fujianese sources. This is 
‘destalked’ by bonded labour and sold on to organised crime groups (HMRC 2008 
Research interviews, 2014). Third, Chinese manufacturers are the key providers of 
synthetic drugs such as ketamine, mephedrone and synthetic cannabis, which have 
become increasingly popular in the UK (Power, 2013). Currently it is not clear what their 
level of involvement is within the cannabis cultivation industry, but research indicates 
that, as the number of cannabis factories within the UK has continued to grow, so has the 
role of Chinese crime groups (Silverstone, 2011; Wang, 2013). 
Finally, as is often the case, those most likely to be exploited within criminal 
enterprises are women. In a patriarchal society which survives Mao’s efforts at reform, 
they are more likely to be making migrations at the bequest of family members and they 
form the most vulnerable group within the UK. It is therefore unsurprising that Chinese 
sex workers and Chinese brothels play an increasing role within the British sex industry. 
In London this is abundantly clear in the blatant advertisements of ‘massage’ services in 
‘Chinatown’. A survey by the Association of Chief Police Officers (as was) identified 
migrant involvement in the off-street sex trade. Chinese people are also regularly near 
the top of foreign nationalities featured within the National Referral Mechanism, a 
mechanism used to identify and support victims of trafficking in the UK (Home Office, 
2014). It should, however, be noted that recent research conducted with Chinese sex 
workers and the networks of agents and pimps around them in America, South East Asia 
and China concluded that, despite the aforementioned exploitation allegations, Chinese 
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sex workers are far more likely to be smuggled than trafficked (Chin and Finckenauer, 
2012).4 Nevertheless, this does not mean that trafficking does not occur and, once they 
are in the country, a minority of migrants who are vulnerable due to their illegal status 
may well be subject to trafficking by others based in the UK. As other authors have 
previously concluded, the two areas of concern in relation to these vulnerable people are 
housekeeping positions and sex work in brothels, both of which are frequently advertised 
as potential employment in the Chinese media (Gourdolan and Lalani, 2009; Mai, 
2009).5 
The evidence for criminal activity is evident in the rare moments of internecine 
conflict which result in murders or other serious violence and therefore prompt police 
investigations (Dees, 2013) but also in the hundreds of advertisements for semi-legal 
services, illegal employment and several kinds of businesses which are prepared to 
subvert the restrictions set up by the British immigration system (Silverstone, 2011). 
They include, for example, illegal employment and smuggling services, provision of 
false documents such as driving licences, provision of impostors to pass both 
International English Language Testing System and Citizenship Tests and commercial 
sexual services. These are all available through the Chinese press. Meanwhile counterfeit 
or non-taxed loose tobacco cigarettes can be bought within London’s Chinatown with 
ease, in the way one might access an open drug market. Finally, and perhaps 
unexpectedly, rather than use the ‘hawala’ banking systems, many illegal migrants use 
Chinese-owned money remittances services which advertise openly and are registered 
legally to launder money back to China (Silverstone, 2011). It is notable that banks in 
rural areas of Fuqing County in Fujian offer a range of international money transfer 
services. These banks are often located in rural areas where the lack of development 
would indicate that such international transfer services are not required by local 
businesses. 
Therefore, it is argued here that the label ‘Chinese organised crime’ covers several 
types of crime and obscures four distinct types of criminal networks which can operate 
independently or join together. First, there are smuggling networks which profit solely 
from the journey (Pieke, 2004; Soudijn, 2006; Zhang, 2008). Second, there are business 
entrepreneurs who manufacture tobacco, DVDs and designer drugs in China and look to 
trade with legal migrants residing in the UK, who might then enlist illegal migrants to 
distribute them. Third, there are elements of the diaspora population who offer illegal 
services which can make a migration successful, such as in the provision of illegal 
employment or false documents. Then finally, there is a revolving population of at least 
80,000 migrants, all desperate to earn back their smuggling fee and then make their 
journey worthwhile. It is these disparate, opportunistic and transnational groups which 
British law enforcement has to tackle. 
Enforcement 
Unsurprisingly, given the complexities outlined above, the policing of organised crime 
has proved a vexing issue for British policing. Since the 1970s successive governments 
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have acknowledged that local police units are unable to deal with the investigative 
complexities that it presents. Instead they have repositioned the threat from organised 
crime as a threat to national security6 (Sheptycki, 2007) and therefore deserving of the 
focus of national policing organisations. First was the National Crime Squad (NCS), 
followed by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and then the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and, during the course of the research, the arrival of 
the National Crime Agency (NCA). 
At the same time, between the years 2009 and 2013, the attempt to tackle organised 
crime effectively has also had to situate itself within the politics of policing austerity. In 
relation to the specialist policing of organised crime, the budget for SOCA was £476 
million in 2009–10, while in its first year funding for the NCA will be approximately 
£407 million (Sproat, 2014: 255), with the latter having a far broader remit than its 
predecessor. There has also been a substantial reduction in police numbers, as there are 
approximately 17,000 fewer police officers at the time of writing since 2010 (Newburn, 
2015). 
These ongoing changes in the constitution and nomenclature of those tasked with 
policing organised crime obscure three broader and long-standing tensions which 
underlie the endeavour. There has been a concerted response from successive 
governments to increase the legislative powers available to those tasked with policing 
organised crime in the UK,7 thus creating a centralised national policing resource 
indisputably more powerful than its predecessors. Simultaneously, though, there has also 
been a countervailing narrative that stresses the Peelian policing principles of community 
policing and local accountability. For example, on the one hand the same Labour 
government which created the post of Police Community Support Officers, on the other 
hand created SOCA. The latter included former senior members of the security services 
and guarded its intelligence in a similarly defensive way. 
The second general tension has been between those who argue that organised crime is 
best tackled by a multi-agency approach (involving Police, HM Customs and/or private 
industry) focusing on a specific problem (such as organised immigration crime) and those 
who think it is best tackled by a singular organisation with its own bespoke organised 
crime agent. What follows from this debate is a third tension concerning the expertise of 
those agents. Should there be country specialists, with core expertise in, for example, 
China, or generalists who are able to tackle organised crime wherever it appears on the 
globe? Although there has been a clear move towards more multi-agency working (as 
clearly set out in the 2013 Home Office Serious and Organised Crime Strategy), none of 
these three tensions had been resolved and, during the course of the research, it was 
evident that there were both specialist agents and multiple agencies, generalists and 
country experts (both local and national), all tasked with tackling the different 
manifestations of Chinese organised crime. 
To unpick these broader issues, in relation to understanding and improving the 
policing response to Chinese organised crime, it is helpful to outline briefly the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM). The ‘NIM is a business model for law enforcement’ and 
provides an intelligence-led approach to policing (O’Connor, 2005). The NIM 
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configured criminality with a tiered hierarchy reflecting law enforcement territorial 
infrastructure. ‘Level 1: Local issues – usually crime, criminals, anti-social behaviour 
and a concomitant need for reassurance – that can be managed within a Basic Command 
Unit (BCU); Level 2: These are cross-border issues; Level 3: Serious and organised 
crime, terrorism or other extremist activity operating on a national or international level’ 
(O’Connor, 2005: 17). Although much admired (James, 2013), it has been recognised 
that the implementation of the NIM model can leave gaps in enforcement and therefore 
every effort should be made to join up the policing of each level (Gilmore, 2008; 
O’Connor, 2005). Drawing on recent interviews with law enforcing personnel working 
at all levels of the NIM model, we will review the effectiveness of this current policing 
response. 
Policing at NIM level 1 
The policing of ethnic minority communities has proved especially problematic for the 
British police service (Bowling and Philips, 2002), characterised as it is by an enduring 
lack of trust between communities and a stubborn inability on the part of the police 
service to make itself visibly represent the communities which it polices (Rollock, 2009). 
As a minority community, the Chinese are extremely unusual in having had a specialist 
units dedicated to their welfare. During the 1980s the police service took the unusual step 
of setting up specialist units in Manchester, Liverpool and London to police their Chinese 
communities. By 2009, these units had been reduced to a single unit, the Metropolitan 
Police’s Charing Cross Chinatown Unit. This unit, which had six full-time officers, was 
active in the borough of Westminster. Despite its immediate policing role being 
geographically conscribed, the officers’ expertise was highly sought after nationally 
(Dees, 2012) and continues to be so (Research interviews, 2015). An in-depth knowledge 
and understanding is vital in tackling Chinese criminality, shielded as it is by language 
and culture that is not well understood by the mainstream Police Service. The unit and 
its officers were singled out as having provided significant help, advice and assistance to 
national forces which were unable to make progress in investigations owing to cultural 
and linguistic barriers (Research interviews, 2015). The research revealed that the unit’s 
community-led approach had also proven effective from 2000 in reducing the impact of 
existing Hong Kong Triads, as restaurant owners reported to these officers any efforts by 
the Triads to extort their profits (Dees, 2012; Research interviews, 2014). 
This is despite the fact that it is only in the last three years that the Metropolitan police 
appointed a Chinese (Cantonese)-speaking officer to police Chinatown, the first officer 
with this skill in 26 years. However, rather than building on acknowledged success and 
looking to recruit Mandarin-speaking officers who can communicate with the new 
diasporas from Fujian, there has been a recent retraction of the unit’s size and it has now 
declined to the point where even the Chinatown unit in London has been dismantled. It 
is argued here that this lack of culturally attuned Chinese-speaking officers is not 
inconsequential. If, for example, a Chinese person is stop-checked by police and gives 
‘Li’ as their name it will be recorded as such. However ‘Li’ can be translated into 30–40 
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different Chinese characters; the value and accuracy of the intelligence collected is then 
greatly diminished. If this information is subsequently shared or used to cross-reference 
information with Chinese authorities it will have no value whatsoever. In a recent 
interview, the challenges faced by the ‘average PC’ in investigating foreign organised 
criminals were described as ranging from working out whether documents in Mandarin 
are of evidential value when doing a raid to understanding whether the person speaking 
to you in the street in Chinese is asking for directions or trying to report a crime (Research 
interviews, 2015). From this year, as reductions to police budgets are implemented, there 
remain just two officers to police Chinatown (down from six in 2009) and they form part 
of a wider West End neighbourhood policing team. 
Policing at NIM level 2 
According to recent research, ‘the establishment of SOCA exacerbated the problem of 
intelligence gaps. The organisation deliberately distanced itself from policing. Its leaders 
chose to distance it from the NIM and in doing so created a Level 2 gap, then attempted 
to plug it by leaving police forces to fill in’ (Stanier, 2012: 121). The government has 
responded to this gap by establishing and resourcing Regional Organised Crime Units 
(ROCUs) which operate across England and Wales on a regional basis. These units 
comprise mainly police officers and staff but can also have embedded representatives 
from other agencies such as the NCA, HMRC and Border Force. When locally based, 
uniformed/CID officers in a force identify criminality that they believe ranks highly 
enough on the National Intelligence Model (NIM) that they can request the ROCU to 
continue the investigation. As the connection between the majority of police officers and 
the NCA, the ROCU plays a vital role in countering organised crime. In practice, though, 
it seems that the links between the ROCU and NCA are not always as strong as the 
multiagency model would suggest. An interviewee commented that, while the NCA has 
equipment stationed in an adjacent office to the ROCU, it does not seem to have the 
personnel resource to use it (Research interviews, 2015). It is also unclear how well 
equipped these units are to tackle threats from Chinese and, more widely, non-
Englishspeaking organised crime groups (OCGs), as this recent, seemingly successful, 
case study illustrates. 
An investigation involved an estimated £14 million money-laundering operation. The 
modus operandi of the OCG was to control bank accounts set up in the name of Chinese 
nationals (many of whom were illegal migrants) who worked for the OCG in brothels, 
on cannabis farms and elsewhere. Money was paid in at locations across England and 
Wales and withdrawn from specific cashpoints in central London. The investigation 
found that one of the individuals in the OCG had access to over 15 different accounts 
into which money had been paid from over 60 locations across England and Wales. This 
money was then almost all withdrawn from a specific location in central London, with 
particular proximity to London’s Chinatown. Over the course of two years the same 
individual who controlled these 15 accounts spent an estimated £4.4 million in one 
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Leicester Square casino – potentially as a means of laundering the money (Research 
interviews, 2015). 
Two significant challenges were noted by law enforcement personnel involved in the 
operation: the impact of austerity on policing, and barriers posed by language difficulties. 
For example, when one of the homes of one of the men involved in the OCG was raided, 
it was found to have 300 mobile phones. It was thought these were being used to manage 
advertisements for sex services and other criminal activity. However, only a small 
number of the phones were investigated for information or links to other 
criminality/criminals. According to an officer in the case, this was because investigation 
is expensive and it can take three months for a phone to be forensically examined and the 
information downloaded. Perhaps more challenging still, the information on the phones 
was in Chinese. It was too expensive to pay for translation and it would also take a 
significant period of time for each phone to be examined. As such, a wealth of potential 
intelligence and information contained on the phones was not thoroughly investigated 
(Research interviews, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the operation resulted in the prosecution of 26 Chinese and Hong Kong 
nationals, with the sentences ranging from 18 months to 5½ years for offences including 
money laundering and brothel management. Additionally, £1.6 million was recovered 
through the Proceeds of Crime Act. This may, then, appear to be a successful operation 
with a large number of convictions and money recovered while investigating a Chinese 
OCG operating nationally. However, despite the operation and prosecution continuing 
over several years and a large number of arrests, it would seem the operation of the OCG 
itself was not affected. Within days of the raids which led to the prosecutions, raids which 
saw brothels closed down and ‘key’ figures in the operation seized, the same 
advertisements for brothels and other services reappeared in the papers. For the operation 
to resume within such a short period of time indicates either the large scale of the group, 
or that the key players in the organisation were not identified. Equally, whilst a large 
amount of money was confiscated, it was acknowledged that a larger amount of money 
was not, and was suspected of having been remitted to China (Research interviews, 
2015). The futility of trying to repatriate this money once it left the UK and reached 
China was also openly acknowledged. Even if a court makes an order to recover the 
money, this will not happen as the Chinese do not currently have the legislation, resources 
or necessarily the will to recover it on behalf of British law enforcement. 
Policing at NIM level 3 
The NCA came into being in October 2013 and is described as (NCA, 2014: 1): 
...an intelligence-led agency driven by a central intelligence hub. This provides a single 
picture of all the threats from serious and organised crime. This collective intelligence 
directly informs the decisions of the NCA, allowing it to have maximum impact when it 
comes to fighting crime. 
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Its remit is also to improve coordination. The extended powers it has to task local law 
enforcement in tackling organised crime imply that there were weaknesses in the 
performance of its predecessor. Certainly within the academic community the general 
efficiency of SOCA has been cast into doubt from its inception to its demise (Addicott, 
2010; Sproat, 2014). Indeed, the recent HMIC (2015: 14) inspection of the NCA 
concludes ‘it inherited, mainly from the Serious Organised Crime Agency, poor 
information technology, analytical capability, and relationships with the police’. 
In our experience the understanding of Chinese organised crime within SOCA was 
patchy. Its main strength was the employment of staff who had previous experience 
within the Chinatown unit and therefore had significant operational experience within 
the community. Research interviews undertaken in 2010 reported that there had been 
some successes at this level. For example, when the Fujianese first started to arrive in the 
UK, there was a spate of kidnappings in which local illegal migrants were attacked and 
then ransoms demanded from relatives in Fujian (Wang, 2013). The then Metropolitan 
police kidnap unit proved effective at liaising with its counterparts within the Ministry 
of Public Security, either directly or through the SOCA international liaison network 
described below, to prevent the ransoms being collected and to arrest the participants. 
One of SOCA’s main weaknesses was the concentration on purported ‘Mr Bigs’ of 
organised crime, meaning that it missed networks of Chinese organised criminals who 
were not involved in class A drugs or activity that did not merit this accolade. 
Additionally, its air of secrecy meant there was a detachment from local policing where 
wellinformed sources and expertise are situated. 
Internationally, as the NCA has enlarged in scope in the context of aforementioned 
budgetary constraints, other agencies have reversed their involvement in organised 
crime: Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs has reduced its workforce significantly and 
lost approximately 40% of the former HM customs and exercise investigation and 
intelligence capacity to SOCA (HMIC, 2009). At the same time, with one or two 
exceptions,8 the security services have moved away from organised crime, faced with the 
serious and sustained threat from violent extremists9 claiming to act in the name of Islam. 
Finally, there are the Home Office Immigration Enforcement, Risk and Overseas Liaison 
Network (RALON) and Border Force. Border Force enforcement work takes place at the 
border to deny illegal entry and immigration enforcement target illegal migrants within 
the UK. The RALON network consists of an international network of immigration 
officers seconded abroad to tackle organised immigration crime upstream. However, 
their mandate to combat organised crime is far more constrained than the other agencies 
and their ability to conduct on-site visits to companies they suspect of fraudulently 
sponsoring students has been curbed (Research interviews, 2010). 
This leaves the NCA’s liaison officers in China, who were already conducting a 
difficult job, relatively poorly supported. As Harfield (2008: 493) has previously 
observed, ‘The role of the liaison officer is not always straightforward and is constrained 
by the political circumstances of the host nation and the fact that liaison officers have no 
authority to investigate directly in their host nation...The liaison community operates 
within a context of routine frustrations and multiple agency agenda’. It could also be 
Silverstone and Whittle 11 
 
added that there is an element of competition between countries in their efforts to get 
local law enforcement organisations to cooperate. In a country such as China which has 
an extremely well-developed security apparatus and still implements the death penalty 
for a declining but still wide range of offences, this job is even harder (Hogg, 2011). This 
is especially so when some local law enforcement personnel in Fujian are complicit in 
the illegal smuggling of people and celebrate their safe arrival as guests at local banquets 
(Pieke, 2004; Zhang, 2008; Research interviews, 2010). Liaison officers have to be 
extremely careful in deciding which information to share and then managing its discrete 
transfer. This problem is compounded by geography: Fujian is far from Beijing and, 
though the Chinese police are a national organisation, there are significant issues in 
relation to forming local arrangements within the region. The nearest British base in the 
region is in the city of Guangzhou, a city of around 10 million, over 600 miles from 
Fujian. 
The Serious Organised Crime Strategy (HM Government, 2013) suggests that 
overseas resources from UK government agencies will work as ‘a single virtual team’ to 
join up their working. However, it ought to be mentioned that SOCA had a similar remit 
but research showed that working relationships, either between agencies or between 
SOCA officers from different occupational backgrounds, were far from seamless. 
Differences between occupational cultures which utilise slightly different classification 
systems and intelligence monitoring can result in services hoarding pyramids of 
information within discrete silos, despite the criminal networks they are targeting being 
fluid and willing to operate across multiple commodities (Stanier, 2012). In this instance 
individual officers were distrustful of each other and not willing to share details of 
operations or contacts. It is not clear whether this issue was specific to China, but other 
scholars who have commented on the role and use of police intelligence across multiple 
law enforcement agencies suggest that this kind of finding is not uncommon (Sheptypki, 
2007; Stanier, 2012). 
Conclusion 
In the recent past, policing scholars have been arguing that perceptions of national 
security threats have evolved beyond a simplistic dualism between internal and external 
security towards an increased focus on ‘global’ security threats (Brodeur, 2005; Reilly 
and Ellison, 2006). This is certainly the sentiment of the latest UK organised crime 
strategy which, on the one hand mentions the importance of more upstream intervention 
and cooperation with other countries in combating organised crime (HM Government, 
2013), and on the other hand the importance of the local, with ‘organised crime groups 
having a corrosive local impact, particularly...among some communities which are new 
to this country’ (HM Government, 2013). However, our work would indicate that the 
rhetoric belies a more disquieting reality, where local policing (Level 1) resources are 
reduced and, unless there is investment in specialist policing expertise with the provision 
of language skills as a key component, the ability to garner local intelligence and to link 
it to effective action within China will be severely limited. Indeed, it is argued that if 
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investment were to be made in subject expertise and the NCA provides an opportunity 
for this, the variety of roles where it could be deployed could make for a varied and 
interesting career. Again, though, the signs are not positive; in 2015, HMIC observed 
‘there was no career structure or training programme for analysts in the NCA’ (HMIC, 
2015: 6). Yet if these warnings are not heeded, and as China’s economic strength 
continues to accelerate and the law-abiding diaspora grows in prowess and achievement, 
the lack of penetration by law enforcement in both China and the UK will be ever more 
noticeable. Overall, unless a clear strategic direction emerges, alongside a commitment 
to appropriate training, it is the broader structural influences such as the macroeconomics 
of recession and the relative rise and fall in currencies that are as likely to influence the 
parameters of Chinese organised crime as the efforts of UK law enforcement. 
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Notes 
1. We have not drawn on direct quotations from the interviews to protect the respondents’ 
identityfurther. 
2. Research interviews (2010; 2015). 
3. With migration this large it must include some active criminals. 
4. And, although they did not interview anyone working in the UK, their principal argument, 
thatthe additional risks of trafficking (maintaining coercive, exploitative or deceptive control 
of the migrant sex workers) outweigh the additional profits that can be obtained, is also likely 
to apply here. 
5. As the UK has found out to its cost with the recent convictions of men involved in the 
internaltrafficking of vulnerable girls, this crime is as prevalent within the UK as outside of it. 
See for example BBC News (2012). 
6. Indeed, the latest Home Office organised crime strategy deliberately utilises the same 
languageof Pursue, Prepare, Prevent and Protect as is used in CONTEST, its counter-terrorism 
strategy (HM Government, 2014). 
7. The most recent example being the Serious Crime Act 2015, which contains new 
legislativemeasures to combat organised crime and also strengthens and deepens several 
existing measures. 
8. For example, Operation Trinity, which involved the domestic security service (MI5) 
targetingcareer criminal Terry Adams (Gillard et al., 2007). 
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